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The article gathers information about the Rule of  Law Framework and analyzes the Rule of  Law 
Framework and its implementation. It starts by introducing the Framework itself. It further maps out its 
implementation via the Recommendations made against Poland. The Recommendations are set within their 
context, and their reception by Poland follows. Building on the experience, the European Commission opened 
a discussion on the future of  the Framework and its potential improvement. The discussion is touched upon 
in the article as well. The article analyzes the effectiveness of  the Framework in a case study in Poland. 
It concludes that the Framework was ineffective with regard to achieving its three functions.
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Introduction
Art. 2 Treaty on the European Union (‘TEU’) stipulates that the European Union (‘EU’) 
is founded on the values of  (…) democracy, the rule of  law and respect for human 
rights. The rule of  law has become of  central importance as it is a prerequisite for effec-
tive application of  EU law and for mutual trust among the Member states.1 The recent 
affairs, especially in Poland and Hungary, have triggered concerns about the presump-
tion of  adherence of  all Member states to the rule of  law and about the EU ’s ability 
to enforce the values. The EU wields several instruments to enforce the Art. 2 TEU 
values: Art. 7 TEU procedure, the infringement procedure, and, more recent additions, 
the Rule of  Law Framework and the Annual Rule of  Law Cycle. They are together 
1 “Strenghtening the Rule of  Law within the Union: A blueprint for action“ (Communication from the 
commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council) COM(2019) 343 
final. European Commission [online]. 2019, p. 1 [cit. 22. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2019%3A343%3AFIN
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referred to as a ‘EU rule of  law toolbox’.2 This article analyzes and discusses the Rule 
of  Law Framework because the first two instruments of  enforcement have enjoyed 
ample attention,3 whereas the Framework has gone more or less unnoticed4 and the last 
one has been put to use very recently and only once.5
The aim of  this article is to analyze the Framework and its implementation. Building 
on the analysis, an assessment of  the Framework’s effectiveness in the form of  a case 
study follows.
The Framework is firstly comprehensively introduced and analyzed in Part 2. Part 3 goes 
through the state of  the art of  legal scholarship concerning the Framework. Building 
on the preceding analysis, an overview of  how the Framework was put into practice fol-
lows in Part 4. In that part, all Recommendations issued on the basis of  the Framework 
are introduced and discussed. Part 5 contains a case study of  Poland. The aim of  the 
case study is to assess the effectiveness of  the Framework. Part 6 concludes.
1  The Rule of  Law Framework and the State of  the Art
The European Commission came up with a new mechanism to enforce rule of  law, 
the new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of  Law (‘Rule of  Law Framework’ 
or ‘Framework’) to complement its rule of  law toolbox. The Commission announced the 
Framework in the communication to the European Parliament and Council on 11 March 
2014.6
The Rule of  Law Framework’s objective is to ‘ensure an effective and coherent protec-
tion of  the rule of  law (…) where there is a systemic threat to the rule of law.’
While the Framework leaves the definition of  the concept of  rule of  law open, it pro-
vides a non-exhaustive list of  six principles that define its core meaning. Those principles 
2 L. Pech offers a chronological overview of  all the rule of  law enforcement mechanisms that the EU wields 
currently. PECH, L. The Rule of  Law in the EU: The Evolution of  the Treaty Framework and Rule 
of  Law Toolbox. Reconnect Working Papers [online]. 2020 [cit. 16. 10. 2020]. Available at: https://www.
ssrn.com/abstract=3608661
3 BESSELINK, L. The Bite, the Bark, and the Howl: Article 7 TEU and the Rule of  Law Initiatives. In: 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017; GORMLEY, L. W. Infringement Proceedings. In: The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: 
Ensuring Member States’ Compliance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017; WENNERÅS, P. Making 
effective use of  Article 260 TFEU. In: The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ 
Compliance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017; PECH, op. cit., 2020.
4 Apart from the fragmentary contributions summarized in the chapter Doctrinal reflection.
5 Too Little, Too Late. Verfassungsblog [online]. 2. 10. 2020 [cit. 26. 11. 2020]. Available at: https://ver-
fassungsblog.de/too-little-too-late/
6 “A new EU Framework to strenghen the Rule of  law“ (Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council) COM(2014) 158 final. European Commission 
[online]. 2014 [cit. 13. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0158
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include legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic pro-
cess for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of  arbitrariness of  the executive powers; 
independent and impartial courts; effective judicial review including respect for funda-
mental rights; and equality before the law.7 The rule of  law is juxtaposed to the principles 
of  democracy and respect for fundamental rights.8 The listed principles suggest adherence 
to the thin notion of  the concept of  rule of  law by the Commission.9 The inclination 
towards the thin notion of  the rule of  law is rather advisable, for the thick notion of  rule 
of  law has been criticized for blurring the lines between the concept of  rule of  law and 
the good law (including democracy etc.),10 thus opening up the Commission for criticism 
of  enforcing other values contained in Art. 2 TEU under the auspices of  the rule of  law. 
Be it as it may, the Commission’s definition reflects the European consensus on the con-
tent of  rule of  law that the Reconnect scholars suggest there is in Europe.11
The Framework admits that there currently exists a gap in the effective mechanisms 
that the EU wields against the systemic threat to the rule of  law. While Art. 258 TFEU 
infringement proceedings may be ineffective for a plethora of  reasons, the Framework 
expressly points out the necessity of  finding a breach of  a specific provision of  EU law. 
And although Art. 7 TEU procedure contains both preventive and sanctioning mecha-
nisms,12 the threshold for activating, especially the latter, is very high.13 The Framework 
thus fills a gap concerning constitutional crises where there is a systemic threat to the 
rule of  law without the existence of  a ‘clear risk of  serious breach’ or ‘serious and per-
sistent breach’ as required by Art. 7 TEU.
7 Ibid., p. 4.
8 Perhaps most clearly in the new Rule of  Law Report. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
COMMISSION TO THE EU ROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EU ROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2020 
Rule of  Law Report The rule of  law situation in the European Union COM(2020) 580 final. European 
Commission [online]. 30. 9. 2020.
9 The thin concepts of  rule of  law limit themselves to formal properties of  laws and legal institutions, 
that are purported to constitute the rule of  law. The thick concepts of  rule of  law require substantive 
elements from a larger vision of  a good society and polity – democratic, free-market, human rights 
respecting, or some such – to be present. KRYGIER, M. Rule of  Law (and Rechtsstaat). UNSW Law 
Research Paper No. 2013-52 [online]. 2013, p. 8 [cit. 20. 3. 2020]. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311874
10 Joseph Raz clearly points out that rule of  law should not be confused with other virtues such as demo-
cracy, respect for human rights, human dignity and alike. RAZ, J. The authority of law: Essays on law and 
morality. Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 211.
11 PECH, L. et al. Meaning and Scope of  the EU Rule of  Law. Reconnect Deliverables, 2020, pp. 38–42.
12 Art. 7 TEU enforces compliance with the values enumerated in Art. 2 TEU. It has a three part structure con-
stiting of  the determination of  “a clear risk of  a serious breach”, “a serious and persistent breach”, and impo-
sition of  sanctions in case of  the determiantion of  the latter. The threshold for determination of  “a serious 
and persistent breach” is unanimity in the European Council. BESSELINK, 2017, op. cit., pp. 129–133.
13 KOCHENOV, D. and L. PECH. Better Late than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of  Law 
Framework and its First Activation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 2016, no. 5, pp. 1065–1066.
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The Framework is a preventative mechanism that precedes triggering Art. 7 TEU seek-
ing to prevent the emergence of  a threat to the rule of  law that could develop into 
a ‘clear risk of  a serious breach’. This objective underlines the whole mechanism.
The Commission is the body to trigger the procedure under the Framework. At what 
point should the Commission trigger the Framework procedure? The Framework is ‘not 
designed to be triggered by individual breaches of  fundamental rights or by a miscar-
riage of  justice’; it can only be triggered against threats to the rule of  law which are 
of  a systemic nature. The Framework builds on the presumption that Member states com-
ply with the rule of  law, thus individual breaches of  the principle do not fall within the 
scope of  the Framework.14
The Commission hints that threats are considered to be systemic when ‘national “rule 
of  law safeguards” do not seem capable of  effectively addressing those threats.’ On this 
basis, Sadurski argues that the collapse or absence of  effective self-correction mecha-
nisms are symptoms and/or cause of  a systemic threat.15
I, for one, do not see a clear relationship between systemic threats to the rule of  law 
and a clear risk of  a serious breach under Art. 7 TEU. Once the rule of  law is systemati-
cally threatened in the way the Commission describes it, i.e. the domestic authorities are 
incapable of  addressing those threats, then it is reasonable to suppose that there is also 
a clear risk of  a serious breach of  the rule of  law. There are hardly more risks of  a seri-
ous breach than the inability of  domestic institutions to address the severe situation.
Once the Framework is triggered, a three-stage process of  a dialogue with the Member 
state concerned ensues. First, the Commission assesses whether there are clear indi-
cations of  a systemic threat to the rule of  law by collecting and examining all relevant 
information. As a result of  the assessment, if  the Commission becomes of  the opinion 
that there is such a threat, it sends the Member state a ‘rule of  law opinion’ substanti-
ating its concerns. A back-and-forth play of  responses follows. Second, if  the Member 
state fails to resolve the situation and the systemic threat to the rule of  law remains, 
the Commission may issue a ‘rule of  law recommendation’ in which it will indicate the 
causes of  the threat and a recommended action to address them within a fixed time 
limit. Third, the Commission will monitor the compliance of  the Member state with the 
recommendation. If  there is no satisfactory resolution, the Commission may have the 
recourse to one of  the mechanisms set out in Art. 7 TEU.16
14 BOGDANDY, A. V., C. ANTPOHLER and M. IOANNIDIS. Protecting EU Values: Reverse Solange 
and the Rule of  Law Framework. In: The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ 
Compliance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 226.
15 SADURSKI, W. Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, 
p. 218.
16 COM(2014) 158 final (n 1), pp. 7–8.
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2  State of  the Art
Now that the Framework has been introduced, I turn to the state of  the art of  legal 
scholarship dedicated to the Framework. The literature on the Rule of  Law Framework 
is rather scarce. Moreover, all but one articles precede the latter 2016 and both 2017 acti-
vations of  the Framework by the Commission against Poland. Hence only the Framework 
itself  and its first activation have so far mainly been taken into account. Hence a more 
detailed and in-depth analysis of  the effectiveness of  the Framework is desirable.
In 2016, Kochenov and Pech assessed the Rule of  Law Framework. Although a step in the 
right direction, the authors found a couple of  shortcomings. First, because a structured 
dialogue between the Commission and the Member state concerned took centre stage, 
Kochenov and Pech doubt the presumption that a discursive approach will be effective 
against countries where the ruling elite had made a deliberate choice to implement mea-
sures clearly in breach of  EU values. Second, adding a legally non-binding step before 
the non-automatic recourse to Art. 7 increases the likelihood of  protracted discus-
sion. Protracted discussion may only allow the recalcitrant government to entrench and 
further legal measures that are incompatible with the Art. 2 TEU values, thus leading 
to ineffective outcomes. Both authors are aware that the validity of  their criticism can 
be tested against time. The Commission’s double standards against Poland and Hungary 
weren’t left uncriticized either.17
Bogdandy, Antpohler, and Ioannidis also left the question of  the effectiveness of  the 
Framework up for the test of  time. On the one hand, the authors expressed cautious 
optimism due to the potential to exert ‘considerable political pressure’ on the Member 
state via activation of  the Framework. On the other hand, the authors remain sceptical 
regarding the dominant role of  the Commission. The effectiveness could be under-
mined by the Commission’s double standards and its politicizations, both of  which had 
been used as a counterargument by Eurosceptics against its Rule of  Law initiatives. That 
is why the authors suggest establishing an independent Systemic Deficiency Committee 
that would replace the Commission.18
The only author to take into account all four recommendations was Sadurski. After 
an analysis of  the Recommendations, Sadurski concludes that the only substantive result 
of  the implementation of  the Framework was the equalization of  the lowered retirement 
age from 67 to 65 for both genders. Other changes were cosmetic, or there were in the 
majority of  cases no changes at all.19 Yet his analysis does not differentiate between the 
functions the Framework could serve and does not offer an in-depth analysis of  its 
effects.
17 KOCHENOV, PECH, 2016, op. cit., pp. 1066–1067.
18 BOGDANDY, ANTPOHLER, IOANNIDIS, 2017, op. cit., pp. 228–229.
19 SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., p. 222.
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3  The Implementation of  the Framework
An overview of  how the Framework was put into practice ensues. There have so far 
been made four recommendations on the basis of  the Framework. All four were aimed 
at Poland.
3.1  The First Recommendation
The Commission first opened a dialogue with Poland in December 2015. Following 
an exchange of  letters, the Commission adopted the first Rule of  Law Opinion on 1 June 
2016. Because the Polish government did not comply, the Commission adopted the Rule 
of  Law Recommendation on 27 July 2016.20
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (‘PiS’), immediately after coming into power in 2015, engaged 
in court packing the Constitutional Tribunal (‘CT’). The previous government had, 
in October 2015, before the election, appointed five judges, 2 of  which were appointed 
unlawfully as they had been appointed prematurely. PiS disregarded the appointment 
of  all five judges, including the lawfully appointed trio, and in December, appointed its 
five judges. The three ‘December’ judges improper appointment and the law stipulating 
that they replace the three ‘October’ judges were on 3 December 2015 and 9 December 
respectively declared unconstitutional by the CT.21
On top of  the court-packing, PiS bombarded the CT with numerous amendments of  the 
statute on the CT. The government tried to approbate its meddling with the three judges 
and to remove the President and Vice-President of  the CT. The CT struck down the 
whole statute on the CT in its judgment from 9 March 2016.22 The government’s reac-
tion was not to publish the judgment, a condition for its bindingness, arguing that it was 
delivered in violation of  the new statute.23
The government went to re-enact similar amendments in the statute on the CT from 
22 July 2016. Notwithstanding that there was a slight improvement of  the law on the 
CT between the 2015 amendment and the new 2016 law following, the statute was 
on 11 August 2016 found unconstitutional by the CT.24
The first Recommendation addressed the invalidity of  the appointment of  the ‘December’ 
judges, the ‘October’ judges not taking up their office, the lack of  publication and implemen-
tation of  the 9 March 2016 Constitutional Tribunal judgment concerning the amendment 
of  the law on the CT and all the consequent decisions, the 22 July 2016 law on the CT, 
20 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 regarding the rule of  law in Poland. European Commission 
[online]. 2016.
21 For more detailed description see SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., pp. 61–65.
22 Ibid., pp. 70–72.
23 Ibid., pp. 75–77.
24 Hence after the first recommendation had been issued. Ibid., p. 71.
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the lack of  effective constitutional review concerning other major legal changes.25 The Com-
mission recommended that the Polish authorities:
• Implement the judgments of  the CT of  3 and 9 December, which require that the 
‘November’ judges take up their position and that the ‘December’ judges nominated 
by PiS without a valid legal basis do not take up their position.
• Publish and implement the judgments of  the CT of  9 March 2016 and its subse-
quent judgments, ensure that the publishment is automatic.
• Ensure the effectiveness of  the CT’s constitutional review is not undermined.
• Refrains from actions and public statements that could undermine the legitimacy 
and efficiency of  the CT.26
The Commission set a three months time limit to implement the recommended action. 
In sum, the first Recommendation addressed mainly the attack on the CT while leaving 
the door open for widening the scope by including the ineffectiveness of  constitutional 
review of  many other laws.
As Sadurski rightly notices, the Polish government waited until the last day of  the limit 
with its response to the first Recommendation.27 The response struck a passive-aggressive 
note by indicating that the Polish government ‘welcomes openly any suggestions on how 
to improve the work of  the constitutional court’, while simultaneously accusing the 
Commission of  not adhering the principles of  ‘objectivism, or respect for sovereignty, 
subsidiarity, and national identity’ and of  basing its ‘unwarranted’ conclusions on incor-
rect assumptions and incomplete knowledge of  the Polish legal system.28 It claimed that 
the ongoing political dispute about the rules on the CT did not amount to a systemic 
threat without providing any grounds for such a claim. The Polish government deemed 
the first Recommendation groundless.29
25 New media law, Civil Service Act, amendments of  the Law on the Police, the Law on the national 
Council of  Media, and new anti-terrosim law.
26 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, para. 74.
27 SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., p. 2019.
28 Kochenov and Bard list four strategies of  authoritarian populists to deflect European criticism. Among 
there are invocation of  national sovereignty when undermining national institutions, the second 
is appeal to constitutional identity. They are both obviously present in the Polish government’s answer. 
KOCHENOV, D. and P. BARD. Rule of  Law Crisis in the New Member States of  the EU: The Pitfalls 
of  Overemphasising Enforcement. Reconnect Working Papers [online]. 2018, pp. 9–12 [cit. 16. 10. 2020]. 
Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3221240
29 MFA statement on the Polish government’s response to Commission Recommendation of  27. 7. 2016. 
Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [online]. [cit. 18. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/
msz_en/news/mfa_statement_on_the_polish_government_s_response_to_commission_recommen-
dation_of_27_07_2016 [The Polish Ministry of  Foreign Affairs webpage underwent major reconstruc-
tion between the time I submitted the article and its publication. None of  the links works now, and the 
articles with the responses have not been transferred to the new webpage. They were not archived either. 
Hence, the Polish government's responses are now unavailable – auth. comment]
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Not only did the Polish government not substantiate its counterarguments in the 
response, but it is also plainly wrong that a non-binding dialogue-based recommenda-
tion may in any way imperil the sovereignty or national identity of  the Polish Republic.
3.2  The Second Recommendation
The second Rule of  Law Recommendation ensued shortly after the first when it was 
clear that the Polish government would stick to its guns. The Commission issued a sec-
ond complementary Recommendation on 21 December 2016.30
At this point, it is important to stress out that the original communication did not 
account for the multiplicity of  recommendations. Only one is presumed by the commu-
nication before the triggering of  Art. 7 TEU is justified. While the Commission’s second 
triggering of  the Framework may have easily been turned against it, it was not, as will 
be shown later, in the responses of  the Polish government to the Recommendations.
The Commission repeated its concerns about the lack of  implementation of  the judg-
ments finding the appointment of  the ‘December’ judges unconstitutional and the inaction 
of  the Polish government about the appointment of  the ‘October’ judges. The Polish gov-
ernment still refused to publish and implement the 9 March 2016 and onwards decision(s) 
of  the CT on the basis that it had the power to review the lawfulness of  the judgments.31
The combined effect of  various measures on the effectiveness of  the constitutional review 
remained. Although the Polish government made some changes to the law on the CT and 
cosmetically improved the situation, it failed to acknowledge and implement the majority 
of  the concerns of  the Commission from the first Recommendation. Interestingly, the 
Polish government amended the law instead of  publishing an 11 August 2016 CT judg-
ment which had declared some of  the provisions of  the law on the CT unconstitutional.
The Polish government had, in the meantime, introduced a new batch of  worrisome mea-
sures. The law on the status of  judges gave the President of  the Republic the power to ini-
tiate disciplinary proceedings against CT judges, the government created an incentive for 
CT judges to retire early and introduced some new requirements of  the judges of  the 
CT, including a declaration of  assets and declaration on the activity of  their spouses. The 
CT was internally reorganized by creating two new chambers. The majority of  the provi-
sions entered into force the day after their publishment without any vacatio legis.32
As a consequence of  these changes, new legislative acts, often passed through the accel-
erated legislative procedure, could not be effectively reviewed. The laws not effectively 
reviewed by the CT include the law on the Ombudsman, on the Public Prosecution 
30 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 regarding the rule of  law in Poland complementary 
to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374. European Commission [online]. 2016.
31 Ibid., para. 15.
32 Ibid., paras. 32–33; SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., p. 33.
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office, the Civil Service Act, the budgetary law on top of  the laws mentioned in the first 
Recommendation. A number of  them raise concerns on their own about the rule of  law 
and fundamental rights. The ineffectiveness of  constitutional review was addressed 
by the Commission.
The Commission lastly addressed the rochade on the position of  the President of  the 
CT. The new Law on the organization and proceedings created a position of  an act-
ing President of  the CT tasked with temporarily carrying out the role of  the President 
of  the CT, hence effectively negating the function of  the Vice-President. The acting 
President of  the CT is appointed by the President of  the Republic without the require-
ment of  the nomination by the CT’s general assembly.33 Moreover, the selection pro-
cedure of  the President of  the CT had been amended so that the participation of  the 
unlawfully elected ‘December’ judges was required.
The changes were immediately put into practice so that PiS-selected judge Julia Przyłębska 
had first been appointed as the acting President. Only to be later selected as the President 
of  the CT by a General Assembly with only six judges present. What’s more, three 
of  the present judges were the unconstitutionally appointed ‘December’ judges, plus the 
whole procedure was mired in irregularities.34
The Commission dedicated more space and effort to finding the ‘systemic threat’ than 
in the first Recommendation. On top of  the recommended actions that had been made 
in the first Recommendation, the Commission recommended that the Polish authorities 
in the 2 months limit:
• Ensure that the CT can review the constitutionality of  the law on the status of  judges, 
the law on the organization and proceedings and the implementing law, and its deci-
sions are published and implemented fully,
• Ensure that no appointment of  the President of  the CT takes place as long as the 
three unlawfully appointed judges to participate and as long as the judgments of  the 
CT on the constitutionality of  the new laws had not been published and imple-
mented fully,
• Ensure that the Vice-President, not the acting President temporarily carries out the 
function of  the President of  the CT.35
As the crisis of  the CT worsened from the first Recommendation, the second 
Recommendation again addressed mainly the changes made to the CT, other laws being 
only implied under the lack of  effective constitutional review.
33 As required when selecting the President of  the CT.
34 For more detailed description of  the whole election procedure see SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., pp. 65–66.
35 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 regarding the rule of  law in Poland complementary 
to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374. European Commission [online]. 2016, p. 62.
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The Polish government yet again waited until the last day of  the limit for its response 
to the second recommendation. It insisted that all the changes to the CT and the replace-
ment of  the President were in line with the European standards and made in order for 
the CT to operate properly. The government, on top of  reiterating its accusations, sharp-
ened its tone by singling out comments made by the Vice-President of  the Commission 
Frank Timmermans. The government even called Timmermans to stop with his 
comments.36
The lack of  good faith on the government’s part is further corroborated by its claim that 
it took into account a number of  recommendations made by the Venice Commission, 
while simultaneously publicly attacking its recommendations for extreme one-sidedness.37
3.3  The Third Recommendation
The Commission adopted a third Recommendation complementary to the first two 
on 26 July 2017.38 The scope of  the Recommendation considerably widened beyond the 
changes to the CT as a reaction to further proposed changes to the judiciary.
The Recommendation starts by observing that none of  the recommended actions 
regarding the CT and the constitutional review had been complied with. That the three 
‘December’ judges still carry out their function, that the President was replaced by the 
acting President Julia Przyłębska, that the judgments from 9 March 2016 onwards had not 
been published, and that the specified laws had not been subject to constitutional review.
The Polish government did not stop at capturing the CT. It presented a set of  new laws 
and new amendments threatening the independence of  the judiciary, including the ordi-
nary judiciary and the Supreme court.
The new law on Ordinary Court Organization granted the Minister of  Justice the power 
to appoint and dismiss court presidents without being bound by concrete criteria. 
The court presidents have a double role of  being the court manager and a judge plus 
they have strong managerial position vis-à-vis other judges.39 The potential dismissal 
36 MFA statement on the Polish government’s response to Commission Recommendation of  27. 7. 2016.
Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [online]. [cit. 18. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/
msz_en/news/mfa_statement_on_the_polish_government_s_response_to_commission_recommen-
dation_of_27_07_2016
37 Minister Waszczykowski: the Venice Commission report is extremely one-sided, PAP dispatch from 
14 October 2016. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [online]. [cit. 18. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://www.
msz.gov.pl/en/news/they_wrote_about_us/minister_waszczykowski__the_venice_commission_
report_is_extremely_one_sided__pap_dispatch_from_14_october_2016
38 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 regarding the rule of  law in Poland complementary 
to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146. European Commission [online]. 2017.
39 For a more extensive debate on the role of  the court presidents, see KOSAŘ, D. and A. BLISA. Court 
Presidents: The Missing Piece in the Puzzle of  Judicial Governance. German Law Journal, 2018, no. 7. 
Available at: https://is.muni.cz/publication/1479897/en/Court-Presidents-The-Missing-Piece-in-the-
Puzzle-of-Judicial-Governance/Kosar-Blisa [cit. 11. 3. 2020].
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or reappointment could threaten their and other judges’ independence.40 The new laws 
allowed the assistant judges, who do not have the same guarantees of  independence 
as the ordinary judges, to act as single judges in district courts.
The National Council of  the Judiciary (‘KRS’) did not go unchanged either as the Polish 
government considered mainly its judicial component as an obstacle to its reform. The KRS 
is a body of  judicial self-governance that safeguards judicial independence and has an impact 
on individual judges as regards their promotion, transfer, disciplinary proceedings, dis-
missal, or early retirement. Before the amendment and according to the Constitution, out 
of  the 25 members KRS, 15 judges-members were appointed by their peers.
The amendment of  the law on the KRS stipulates that the 15 judges-members would 
be chosen and potentially reappointed by Sejm. In total, 23 out of  25 members of  the 
KRS would be elected either by Sejm or Senate. That would have significantly hiked the 
influence of  Sejm over the KRS and indirectly threatened the independence of  judges. 
Moreover, the mandates of  all the current judges-members would be prematurely ter-
minated despite the length of  the mandate being Constitutionally guaranteed.41 The 
Recommendation also addressed the internal restructuring of  the KRS, and it pointed 
out the potential unconstitutionality of  the amendment and recalled the unavailability 
of  effective constitutional review.42
The last batch of  proposed changes involved the Supreme court. The major concern 
of  the Commission was the forcible termination of  mandates and retirement of  all 
judges of  the SC the day following the entry of  force of  the new law on the SC. They 
could be possibly reappointed upon a decision of  the President of  the Republic on the 
basis of  an indication of  the Minister of  Justice and a consultation with the KRS.
The retirement age of  the SC would be lowered from 67 to 65 years for male judges and 
from 67 to 60 years for female judges. The Minister of  Justice would gain the power 
to extend the mandate upon a request from an individual judge, thus increasing the influ-
ence of  the Minister could exert over individual judges and threatening their indepen-
dence. The Recommendation concluded that the combination of  lowering the retirement 
age with the power of  the Minister to extend the mandates undermines the principle 
of  irremovability of  judges, which is a crucial element of  independence of  the judiciary.
The Recommendation also addressed the changes made to the disciplinary proceedings 
against judges. A new disciplinary chamber was to be established, the disciplinary pro-
ceedings could be initiated by the Minister of  Justice, plus their role would be further 
40 Paras. 18–23.
41 SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., pp. 99–102.
42 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 regarding the rule of  law in Poland complemen-
tary to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146. European Commission [online]. 2017, 
paras 24–30.
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strengthened in the proceedings. The changes to the disciplinary proceedings would fur-
ther undermine the independence of  judges.
The Commission also pointed out the fast tracking and lack of  discussion during the 
legislative process.
On top of  the recommended actions that had been made in the first two Recommen-
dations, the Commission recommended that the Polish authorities in the 1-month limit:
• Ensure that the laws on the KRS, on Ordinary Court Organization and on the 
SC do not enter into force and that the law on the KRS complies with the Constitution 
and the European standards,
• Refrain from any measures interfering with the mandate of  the SC judges,
• Ensure that any justice reform upholds the rule of  law and complies with the EU stan-
dards on judicial independence,
• Refrain from actions and public statements that could undermine the legitimacy and 
efficiency of  the CT, the SC, the ordinary courts, and the judiciary as a whole.43
The Polish government published a statement the day the third recommendation was 
issued. The government accused the Commission of  using ‘a language of  ultimatums’, 
calling the non-binding recommendation as a premature ‘interference with the legislative 
process in Poland’ because the reform of  the Polish judiciary had yet not been carried 
out. The government attacked the Commission for its partiality, lack of  understanding 
of  the fundamental and substantive aspects of  the reform, and its lack of  competence.44 
The government asked for further clarification,45 only to attack the Commission for 
its absence of  willingness to engage in a dialogue and insufficient concreteness of  its 
reply.46 After asking for one more clarification, the government corroborated its claims 
about the lack of  a constructive dialogue by pointing out that Timmermans’ position 
coincided with the stance of  the Polish opposition.47
43 Ibid.
44 MFA statement following the European Commission’s Recommendation of  26 July 2017 regarding the 
rule of  law in Poland . Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [online]. [cit. 18. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://
www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_statement_following_the_european_commission_s_recommendation_
of_26_july_2017_regarding_the_rule_of_law_in_poland_
45 Letter of  Polish Foreign Minister to European Commission’s First Vice-President. Ministerstwo 
Spraw Zagranicznych [online]. [cit. 18. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/
letter_of_polish_foreign_minister_to_european_commission_s_first_vice_president_
46 MFA communique following reply from Commission First Vice-President to Polish Foreign 
Minister’s letter. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [online]. [cit. 18. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://www.
msz.gov.pl/en/news/mfa_communique_following_reply_from_commission_first_vice_president_to_
polish_foreign_minister_s_letter_1
47 Communique following European Commission reply to MFA letter. Ministerstwo Spraw 
Zagranicznych [online]. [cit. 18. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/
communique_following_european_commission_reply_to_mfa_letter
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The accusation of  premature interference is quite ironical in the perspective of  the 
Framework being a preventative mechanism, not one aimed at resolving already inflicted 
damage to the rule of  law. It is only logical that the Commission would intervene before 
any harmful changes of  the judiciary are implemented. The rest of  the response only 
reflects the paranoia and lack of  good will at the side of  the Polish government.
3.4  The Fourth Recommendation
The last Recommendation was issued on 20 December 2017 following a number of  legal 
changes of  the judiciary.48 The Polish government went through with several changes 
despite the previous recommendations. In the new law on the SC from December 2017, 
the retirement age of  the SC judges was lowered to 65,49 forcibly retiring around 37 % 
judges. The forced retirement would entail the premature termination of  the mandate 
of  the SC President. The new law gave power to the President of  the Republic upon 
request of  the judges to prolong their mandate. The President was not bound by any 
criteria, nor timeframe. The early retirement, the prospect of  request for prolonga-
tion of  the mandate, the implied far-reaching personal recomposition in combination 
with the changes to the KRS threatened judicial independence and raised the issues 
of  unconstitutionality.50
The new law also introduced an extraordinary appeal procedure. The SC could review 
any decision from the past 20 years delivered by a Polish court, thus undermining the 
principle of  legal certainty, a key component principle of  the rule of  law under the 
Framework. The grounds for the appeal were indeed very broad.51 The law also amended 
the disciplinary procedure.
The second batch of  criticism was addressed against the changes made to the KRS. 
The Polish government went through the changes, prematurely terminated man-
dates of  all the judges-members and changed the appointment procedure so that the 
judges-members would be appointed by Sejm en bloc. Again, concerns regarding judicial 
independence and the constitutionality of  the changes were raised.52
48 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 regarding the rule of  law in Poland complementary 
to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520. European Commission 
[online]. 2017.
49 The first proposal contained an unequal retirement age of  female and male SC judges. The government 
bent to the pressure and equalized it to 65. SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., p. 222.
50 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 regarding the rule of  law in Poland complementary 
to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520. European Commission 
[online]. 2017, paras. 5–17.
51 SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., p. 114.
52 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 regarding the rule of  law in Poland complementary 
to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520. European Commission 
[online]. 2017, paras. 22–35.
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The Commission mainly reiterated its recommended actions from the previous Rec-
ommendations and made 2 novel recommended actions concerning the new laws. The 
Polish authorities should in three months:
• Ensure amendment of  the law on the SC so that the lowered retirement age does 
not apply, the discretionary power of  the President of  the Republic to prolong man-
dates is removed, the extraordinary appeal procedure is removed,
• Ensure that mandates of  the judges-members of  the KRS are not prematurely ter-
minated and that they are appointed by their peers.53
The government did not respond to the last Recommendation as it saved up its argu-
ments for the response to the reasoned proposal.54
3.5  The reasoned proposal
The last Recommendation was issued along with the reasoned proposal under 
Art. 7(1) TEU.55 The reasoned proposal is required to trigger the preventative mecha-
nism of  Art. 7 TEU. The proposal must be ‘reasoned’, i.e. it must contain information 
and the basis for the conclusion reached by the reasoned proposal.
The reasoned proposal lodged by the Commission heavily builds on the first three 
Recommendations. The explanatory memorandum attached to the proposal explicitly 
refers to the Recommendations for more detailed information on the development 
in Poland as the proposal contains ‘an overview of  the main developments’.56
The proposal contains an implicit evaluation and a brief  evaluation of  the effective-
ness of  the preceding dialogue under the Framework. The reasoned proposal is pre-
sented as ‘a new phase of  dialogue formally involving the European Parliament and the 
Council’ after that two years of  dialogue with Poland had not led to results and had not 
prevented further deterioration of  the situation.’57 To me, calling a potential determina-
tion of  ‘a clear risk of  a serious breach of  the rule of  law’ as a new phase of  dialogue 
is a major understatement of  the gravity of  the situation.
While the reasoned proposal admits the ineffectiveness of  the prior dialogue, it also 
submits that all the Recommendations played an important role in supplementing 
53 Ibid., paras. 22–35.
54 MFA statement on the European Commission’s decision to launch the disciplinary process against Poland 
laid out in Article 7 of  the TEU. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych [online]. [cit. 18. 2. 2020]. Available at: 
https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/news/mfa_statement_on_the_european_commission_s_deci-
sion_to_launch_the_disciplinary_process_against_poland_laid_out_in_article_7_of_the_teu
55 Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of  a clear risk of  a serious bre-
ach by the Republic of  Poland of  the rule of  law COM(2017) 835 final. 2017. European 
Commission [online]. [cit. 13. 2. 2020]. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?qid=1555065725694&uri=CELEX%3A52017PC0835
56 Explanatory memorandum of  the Proposal, para. 6.
57 Explanatory memorandum of  the Proposal, para. 184.
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the Commission with sufficient information to issue a reasoned proposal under 
Art. 7(1) TEU. Moreover, the failure to comply with the Recommendations is used 
as a justification for the proposal.58 It is important to keep in mind that the Commission 
admits that the Framework failed all its roles, but the information-gathering role.
3.6  The future of  the Framework
The last two documents in which the Recommendation figures are the 2019 Commissions 
communications on the future of  the rule of  law within the Union59 and the blueprint 
for action.60
The first document presents a self-reflection on the numerous rule of  law instruments 
the EU wields and on their usage. When shifting the focus to the future, the document 
discusses possibly promotion, prevention, and enforcement of  the value of  the rule 
of  law. The communication again stresses the importance of  establishing an effective 
dialogue as a solution to the rule of  law crises and Framework’s key role in creating the 
knowledge base in further action from the Union.
The communication ponders several potential improvements: a greater involvement 
of  other institutions (the EP, the Council, the Venice Commission, the CoE), under-
pinning the dialogue with specific action plans and technical support, and strengthening 
consequences if  a Member state fails to remedy the situation. The document concludes 
by inviting relevant stakeholders for a debate.
The blueprint for action is the follow up on the first document. It builds on the debate 
that had been led in the meantime. The Commission would in the future involve 
other EU institutions more regularly when implementing the Rule of  Law Framework.61 
Moreover, the Framework would come with clearer procedures and timelines.62 The 
document does not specify what exactly does that mean. Lastly, perhaps more implic-
itly, the Commission vowed that the EU action would be objective, proportionate, and 
non-discriminatory.63
58 Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of  a clear risk of  a serious breach by the Republic 
of  Poland of  the rule of  law COM(2017) 835 final. European Commission [online]. 2017, para. 3l [cit. 13. 2. 2020].
59 “Further strenghtening the Rule of  Law within the Union: State of  play and possible next steps” 
(Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the 
Council) COM(2019) 163 final. European Commission [online]. 2019. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52019DC0163
60 “Strenghtening the Rule of  Law within the Union: A blueprint for action” (Communication from the 
commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council) COM(2019) 343 final. 
European Commission [online]. 2019, p. 1 [cit. 22. 2. 2020].
61 Ibid., p. 50.
62 Ibid., p. 14.
63 Ibid., p. 3.
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4  Case-study: Poland
In this part, I critically assess whether the Framework was effective in achieving its 
goals. I argue that the Framework aimed at achieving three objectives: eliciting a change 
of  national law or practice concerning rule of  law, gathering information related to rule 
of  law for future use, and mobilizing internal actors other than the government encroach-
ing upon rule of  law. Keeping in mind that the Framework is a case of  soft-law mechanism 
with weakened dimension of  obligation and precision,64 the goal of  eliciting a change 
of  law or of  practice (or preventing such change) flows from the Framework’s text itself  
(see Part 1). The goal of  gathering information follows from its ensuing implementation 
(see Part 3.5) and the official debate surrounding it (Part 3.6). The effectiveness of  the 
Framework will now be assessed against the background of  these three goals.
The first goal of  eliciting change in law and in practice could be understood in two 
terms. First, the objective could be understood in broader terms as aiming at eliciting 
a profound change of  legal culture and adoption of  new patterns of  political behaviour 
in Member states. Second, the objective could be understood in more limited terms 
as aiming to force certain legislative changes in Member states.65 Since the Framework 
is a soft-law mechanism and the Recommendations have always identified concrete 
issues, its effectiveness will be measured against the more limited understanding of  the 
objective.
Hence in terms of  the first objective, the effectiveness of  the Framework is assessed 
as the impact of  the Framework upon the issues identified in the implementing recom-
mendations. For more clarity, I created a table of  the chronological development of  the 
recommended actions made by the Commission addressed to Poland.
Table 1: The chronological overview of  the issues identified sorted by the recommendations 
(x stands for non-implementation and new signals the issue appearing for the first time).
Issue 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
full implementation of  3 and 9 December 2015 
CT judgments (three ‘October’ judges can take up their 
post, while three ‘December’ judges cannot)
new x x x
publish and implement the CT judgments from 9 March 
onwards new x x x
any reform of  the Law on the CT respects the case-law 
of  the CT new x x x
64 ABBOTT, K. W. and D. SNIDAL. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. International 
Organization, 2000, no. 3, p. 422.
65 GOLDNER LANG, I. The Rule of Law, the Force of Law and the Power of Money in the EU. Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network, 2020. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3545940 [cit. 
20. 12. 2020].
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Issue 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
the effectiveness of  the CT is not undermined new x x x
the CT can review the compatibility of  the new law 
on the CT new x x x
refrain from actions and public statements that could 
undermine the legitimacy and efficiency of  the CT new x x x
the CT can review the Law on the status 
of  judges, on rganization and proceedings and 
the Implementing law
new x x
no appointment of  the President of  the CT takes place 
as long as the judgments have not been fully published 
and implemented and as long the October judges 
haven’t taken up their function
new x x
ensure that the acting President does not replace the 
President of  the CT new x x
the law on the KRS, Ordinary Courts Organization, 
on the SC do not enter into force, the law on the KRS 
is withdrawn/amended not to violate the Constitution 
and European standards
new x
any justice reforms respekts the rule of  law and 
complies with EU law and European standards, new x
the law on the SC is amended not to apply lowered 
retirement age, the discretionary power of  the PotR 
to prolong the mandate is removed, the extraordinary 
appeal procedure is removed
new
the law on the KRS is amended so that the mandate 
of  judge-members it not terminated and new 
appointement regime removed
new
refrain from actions and public statements that could 
undermine the legitimacy of  the CT, ordinary courts 










The table quite clearly corroborates the claim of  the ineffectiveness of  the Framework 
with regard to changing the course of  action of  the rule of  law backsliding in Poland. 
The ineffectiveness of  the Framework in terms of  the first goal can be further illus-
trated on the reaction of  the Polish government to the individual recommendations. 
In my view, they also prove that a more systemic and profound change is unlikely 
to result from the Framework.
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The reactions of  the Polish government only show its unwillingness to engage in a con-
structive dialogue with the Commission. The government failed to substantiate its accu-
sations and arguments, and its rhetoric grew more aggressive and harsher. A change 
of  law or of  practice could not be expected by an actor, the government, using such 
harsh rhetoric and disregard for good faith dialogue. It only corroborates Kochenov 
and Pech’s conclusion that a government intentionally undermining the rule of  law 
and unwilling to enter into a dialogue in good faith cannot be expected to change its 
practice under a dialogue-based mechanism.
In terms of  the second goal, I argue that the Framework was a success. The information 
gathered in the recommendations was put into practice in the latter reasoned proposal 
(see Part 3.5). The downside of  the information-gathering function is that it only works 
with regard to the Member state that is already on track to rule of  law backsliding. The 
issue of  potential discrimination and partiality may be in future resolved by the upcom-
ing Annual Rule of  Law Cycle, which applies to all Member States. The implementation 
of  the Cycle, in turn, undermines the information gathering purpose of  the Framework 
as it would be better served by a different tool.
In terms of  the third goal, it hard to track down the impact of  the Framework upon 
the internal actors. The judiciary reforms have repeatedly sparked massive protests, for 
example, massive protests against the reforms effectively capturing the ordinary judi-
ciary and the KRS.66 The Framework’s most tangible appearance is the joint Open Letter 
to the College of  Commissioners regarding the situation in Poland sent by a plethora 
of  international and Polish NGOs. According to the signatory NGOs, the Framework 
was a welcome addition to the EU rule of  law toolbox, and the NGOs expressed a fond-
ness of  the Commissions follow up Art. 7 TEU activation. Yet, the NGOs remained 
concerned about the development of  rule of  law backsliding in Poland.67
The signing NGOs include NGOs focused on LGBT+ rights (Stowarzyszenie Queerowy 
Maj), on human rights (Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka), or civic society (Sieć 
Obywatelska Watchdog Polska). Hence the Framework reached out at least to some seg-
ments of  the non-legal community. For a legal tool to reach the non-legal community 
can, in my eyes, be considered a success.
Conclusion
The Rule of  Law Framework was the centrepiece of  this article. So far, it has escaped 
close attention, and the majority of  it came before or around its first implementation. 
66 SADURSKI, 2019, op. cit., p. 99.
67 Open Letter to the College of  Commissioners regarding the situation in Poland. Amnesty International 
and other NGOs [online]. 2017 [cit. 26. 11. 2020]. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/EUR3756842017ENGLISH.PDF
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Around six years have elapsed between now and the Framework’s establishment. That 
is more than sufficient time to analyze its effectiveness. Building on the detailed and 
thorough analysis carried out in this article, it is now possible to conclude that the 
Framework was only effective in its information-gathering function. It failed in eliciting 
almost any change in law or the political practice of  a Member state.
As the rule of  law situation in Poland and Hungary is arguably worsening, the need 
to evaluate the effectiveness of  EU law’s current mechanisms is even more pressing 
to improve them, building upon the experience. The Commission is well aware of  the 
need to evaluate and potentially change its approach. That’s why it at the beginning 
of  2019 opened a discussion on the current state and the future of  the rule of  law within 
the EU. The question of  whether legal instruments can solve the rule of  law crises across 
the Member states underlies the whole discussion and cannot be avoided in the future.
What is perhaps even more striking is the Commission’s lack of  self-reflection and 
overreliance on soft-law dialogue-based mechanisms, given their apparent ineffective-
ness. Their ineffectiveness has been admitted by the Commission itself  (see above) and 
pointed out by scholars.68 Information gathering is the only role Framework. Similarly, 
the Justice scoreboard has succesfully played, which cannot in itself  warrant the expecta-
tion that they will halt the rule of  law backsliding. As Kochenov and Bard point out, the 
invention of  new soft-law procedures cannot justify the EU ’s inactivity and engagement 
with other mechanisms.69
68 KOCHENOV, BARD, 2018, op. cit., pp. 16–17.
69 Ibid., p. 16.
